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Abstract 
Debt overhang and moral hazard predict that poorly capitalized banks have a lower likelihood to 
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I. Introduction 
Bank capital is essential to ensure bank survival and safeguard financial stability (Berger and 
Bouwman (2013), Diamond and Rajan (2000)). Among the different options that poorly capitalized 
banks can pursue to restore their capital adequacy, raising equity in the stock market via Seasoned 
Equity Offerings (SEOs) appears an effective and timely solution. This is because, differently from 
recapitalization strategies based on the accumulation of retained earnings, SEOs allow poorly 
capitalized banks a fast and substantial re-balancing of the capital structure toward the desired target.  
The existing literature is, however, very inconclusive with regard to whether poorly capitalized 
banks are likely to rely on equity issuance. In particular, two contrasting views have been proposed. 
A first view suggests that numerous disincentives discourage banks to issue equity (Acharya et al. 
(2011), Coates and Scharfstein (2009), Khan and Vyas (2014), Krishnan et al. (2010), and Squam 
Lake Working Group (2009)). The debt overhang framework proposed by Myers (1977) explains 
part of these disincentives. More precisely, banks, as other companies, are unwilling to issue equity 
because creditors and claimants senior to common shareholders would capture a portion of the 
benefits of new equity while the claim of the existing shareholders will be diluted (Acharya et al. 
(2011), Admati et al. (2012), and Coates and Scharfstein (2009)). Furthermore, for banks the 
disincentives to issue are potentially exacerbated by their typically high leverage (Admati et al. 
(2012)) as well as by the presence of risk-shifting opportunities for shareholders due to the 
expectation to receive government support when banks are unable to re-pay their debts (Gornall and 
Strebulaev (2013)).   
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In contrast, a second view suggests that capital requirements and market forces create incentives 
for poorly capitalized banks to issue equity (see for instance Admati et al. (2012), Berger et al. (2008), 
Dahl and Shrieves (1990), and Erkens et al. (2012)). The regulatory pressure to comply with capital 
requirements should induce banks to issue equity when the low degree of capital strength signals a 
low regulatory capital adequacy. In addition, the presence of market discipline might force poorly 
capitalized banks to raise equity when they are closer to the default point - independently from their 
degree of capital strength according to regulatory standards. Furthermore, since the poor degree of 
capitalization exposes banks to extraordinary regulatory and market pressures that might impose a 
rapid adjustment of the capital structure (Berger et al. (2008)), SEOs are likely to become the 
preferred recapitalization strategy. 
In this paper, we evaluate the relative importance of these two contrasting views in explaining the 
decision of poorly capitalized banks to raise equity in the stock market by presenting the first study 
on the determinants and timing of SEOs in the banking industry. We build our analysis on a large 
international sample of banks operating in the G20 countries and selected for an extensive time 
period ranging from the beginning of 1993 to the first half of 2011. We opt for an international 
sample of banks for three key reasons. 2 First, the international dimension of the sample offers the 
opportunity to assess the importance of pressures stemming from capital requirements on equity 
issuance via the numerous events of capital regulation changes at the national level observed in our 
                                                 
2 Our sample includes a large share of US banks. However, the results are not driven by the peculiarities of these banks: the main 
findings are qualitatively confirmed when we focus only non-US banks. 
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sample. Second, the international dimension of the sample allows us to evaluate the role of market 
discipline on equity issuance by using cross-country differences in systemic conditions as a source of 
variation in market discipline. This is the case since the eruption of a systemic shock, and the 
consequent increase in the likelihood of a state intervention to stabilize the banking system, does not 
simply increase risk-shifting opportunities for shareholders, but also undermines market discipline 
because of a lower sensitivity of bank creditors to fundamentals (Acharya et al. (2013), 
Balasubramnian and Cyree (2011), Hasan et al. (2013), Hett and Schmidt (2013), Levy-Yeyati et al., 
(2004), and Martinez-Peria and Schmukler (2001)). As a result, if market discipline might work as an 
incentive to issue equity by poorly capitalized banks, this should be the case during normal systemic 
conditions but less so during periods of systemic distress. Third, the cross-country feature of our 
sample gives us the opportunity to assess the role played by market discipline on the likelihood of an 
SEO by focusing on a sufficiently large sub-sample of poorly capitalized banks for which market 
pressure can be ineffective since they might be qualified as having a too-big-to-fail status.  
We start our analysis by showing that SEOs are more likely to occur in poorly capitalized banks. 
Therefore, debt overhang and the moral hazard related to risk-shifting opportunities do not seem to 
play a dominant role in guiding SEOs by poorly capitalized banks. We then explore whether the 
result that these banks are more likely to issue is mainly driven by capital regulation. Initially, we 
disentangle the role of capital regulation from the influence of other incentives to issue equity by 
investigating the different behavior of regulatory constrained banks (defined as banks with an 
extremely low regulatory capital buffer) and regulatory unconstrained banks. We show that poorly 
capitalized banks are more likely to issue equity especially when they are not regulatory constrained 
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and are then unlikely to be under the pressure of regulators. Next, we examine the role of regulation 
by employing the changes in capital regulation as quasi-natural experiments under a difference-in-
difference setting. Our prior is that if capital requirements are a key driver of equity issuance by 
banks, we should observe that SEOs become more frequent in periods of increases in minimum 
capital requirements and especially in poorly capitalized banks. We find that regulatory changes do 
not increase the likelihood of an SEO by poorly capitalized banks. This result suggest that regulatory 
pressure seems to play a limited role on the decision of poorly capitalized banks to raise equity and 
supports the importance of market pressure on this decision.  
In the following steps of our analysis, we provide more direct evidence on the importance of 
market discipline on our findings by showing that poorly capitalized banks do not raise equity in the 
quarters immediately following the eruption of a severe systemic shock. By contrast, they are more 
likely to raise equity than other banks in normal systemic conditions; that is, only when they are 
expected to be subject to more stringent market discipline than other banks (Acharya et al.(2013), 
Balasubramnian and Cyree (2011), Hasan et al. (2013), Levy-Yeyati et al. (2004), Martinez-Peria and 
Schmukler (2001), and Hett and Schmidt (2013)).We further underline the importance of market 
discipline by showing that the reluctance of banks to issue following a systemic shock is strongest 
for the largest banks in our sample. This is in support for the role of market forces since the largest 
banks are the banks for which due to the expectations of government bail-outs market discipline 
loosens most while the costs of issuing equity raise least in a crisis.  
Finally, we show that poorly capitalized banks are also in search of a rapid re-balancing strategy. 
In essence, by analyzing other options that banks can chose to re-balance their capital structure, we 
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find that poorly capitalized banks do not use more frequently than other banks recapitalization 
strategies that might require a longer period to be effective such as increases in capital via the 
accumulation of retained earnings. Furthermore, the issuance of an SEO is also preferred to a de-
leveraging strategy implemented via a decrease in bank’s assets. 
Overall, we find that market mechanisms rather than capital regulation are the primary and key 
driver of the decision to issue equity by poorly capitalized banks. This finding is consistent with the 
view that capital regulation is often not binding (Allen et al. (2011), Diamond and Rajan (2000), 
Flannery (1994), Myers and Rajan (1998)) and motivates regulatory interventions that aim at 
increasing the default risk-sensitivity of bank funding costs. For instance, this can be achieved via 
minimum mandatory requirements for uninsured debts such as subordinated debts (Evanoff and 
Jagtiani (2011), Flannery and Sorescu (1996), Sironi (2003)). Furthermore, the behavior of the largest 
poorly capitalized banks during periods of systemic distress suggests that the introduction of 
countercyclical capital buffer and forms of contingent capital that have to be converted in equity 
during more unstable systemic conditions has to be especially directed towards too-big-to-fail banks 
(Flannery (2009)).  
The analysis presented here provides the first empirical evidence on the drivers of SEOs in the 
banking industry and in particular on the role of bank capital strength. While a wide corporate 
finance literature has investigated explanations of SEOs in non-financial firms (see for instance 
Dittmar and Thakor (2007), De Angelo et al. (2010), Kim and Weisbach (2008), and Erel et al. 
(2012)), these studies suggest that their findings might be problematic to extend to banks because of 
their peculiar capital structure and the presence of capital regulation. The empirical evidence on bank 
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equity issuance is instead limited to a handful of US-based studies focusing on the market reaction 
following SEOs (Cornett and Tehranian (1994), Cornett et al. (1998), Krishnan et al. (2010)) or on 
SEOs in the context of the recent global turmoil (Khan and Vyas (2014) and Elyasiani et al. (2014)).  
Specifically, earlier event studies on US banks indicate that the market does not penalize poorly 
capitalized banks when they issue equity (Cornett et al. (1998)), with the implication that for these 
banks it would be less costly to raise capital in the stock market. More recent analyses, however, 
conclude that the market reaction to SEO announcements does not vary with bank capital strength 
(Krishnan et al. (2010)). Contrasting results on the link between bank equity ratios and the likelihood 
of SEOs are also offered by two recent studies for the US banking system (Khan and Vyas (2014) 
and Elyasiani et al. (2014)). In general the extant literature omits the thorough analysis of the forces 
behind the banks’ decision to issue equity through the distinction between normal and crisis periods. 
This bears potential risks on the consistency of their findings, since, as we show here, the trade-off 
between the incentives and disincentives to issue might change substantially during crisis times. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II describes the sample, the econometric 
model and variables, while section III presents the empirical results on how bank capital strength 
influences the likelihood to issue equity. Section IV extends the analysis to the interplay between 
capital strength and systemic conditions and its effect on equity issuance by large and small banks. 
Section V compares SEOs to other alternatives to restore bank capital strength. Section VI offers 
conclusions.  
II. Sample Selection, Econometric Model and Variable Definition 
A. The Sample of Banks and SEOs  
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The estimation of the likelihood that a bank issues common equity requires the identification of i) 
the population of banks which can opt for an SEO in a given time period; ii) the number of banks 
that have issued an SEO in the same period. 
The population of banks has been identified using the list of publicly traded and delisted banking 
firms drawn from Datastream International for the period from the 1st of January 1993 to the 30th of 
June 2011. From this list, including more than 4,000 institutions, we maintain in the sample only 
banks that trade common equity, operate in G20 countries and have accounting information 
available in WORLDSCOPE. The application of these three criteria yields a population of 2,177 
unique banks chartered in 19 countries. Next, we remove US banks listed in OTC markets given 
their specificity in terms of capital raise. This reduces the number of banks in our sample to 1,522.  
We then identify which banks have issued common equity during the period under investigation 
from the list of announced bank SEOs from January 1993 to June 2011 extracted from Thomson 
One Banker. This produces an initial list of 3530 SEOs. We merge the initial list of issuing banks 
within our population of banks. We use the ISIN code to match the two datasets and when not 
available the SEDOL code. On the resulting sample of issuing banks we apply several additional 
selection criteria. First, we remove pure secondary offers as they are based on the exchange of 
existing shares without any impact on the level of bank equity. Second, we remove equity offers that 
have been withdrawn after their announcement and, hence, do not produce any effect on bank 
capital structure.  
******TABLE 1***** 
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As summarized in Panel A of Table 1, the application of these criteria leads to a final sample of 
912 SEOs in our population of banks with a high concentration of issuances in the latest part of the 
sample period. The time series evolution of the number of SEOs highlights that banks do not 
frequently rely on SEOs and, as suggested by Khan and Vyas (2014), this is especially true before 
2008. More precisely, in the period ranging from 1993 to 2007, we observe an annual average of 33 
SEOs with a total number equal to 558 (about 61% of the total sample). The rarity of the issues is 
demonstrated by the ratio between the total number of SEOs and the total number of bank-year 
observations: over the full sample period this ratio is equal to 5.18%.  
Panel B of Table 1 reports the distribution of the SEOs sample by country and shows that the 
largest share of SEOs (around 47%) is concentrated in the US. However, in the following sections 
we show that our results are similar when we exclude the US banks from our sample. Finally, the 
average proceed of the issue is equivalent to 490 US$ billions, which is large relatively to the book 
value of bank equity. For instance, for the median issuing bank, the ratio between the proceeds and 
the book value of equity is equal to 1.2. Hence, though not particularly frequent, when SEOs occur 
they produce a relevant change in the amount of capital held by the issuing bank. 
B. Econometric Model  
We model the determinants of the probability that a bank issues an SEO using a panel random 
effect logit specification where the dependent variable is a dummy equal to one when a bank has 
issued common equity in a given time period. While earlier research on nonfinancial firms mainly 
uses pooled regressions, and controls for the panel structure of the dataset by clustering the standard 
errors at the firm level (see for instance De Angelo et al. (2010)), we prefer to incorporate in the 
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analysis a panel specification as it controls for unobserved bank heterogeneity. Although the 
clustering of the standard errors controls for heterogeneity in the estimation of the standard errors, 
it does not remove the potential downward bias of the estimated coefficients that the omission of 
firm-specific effect could generate (Greene (2002)).  
Furthermore, we model the firm specific effect as a random component for two reasons. First, 
the estimation of a logit fixed effect specification would produce a large reduction in the sample size, 
as the model requires some variation in the dependent variable at the bank level. As a result, banks 
that have not issued equity over the analyzed sample period would have to be removed from the 
analysis. In our sample this would imply the exclusion of 1021 banks from the analysis with a 
consequent strong sample selection bias. Second, the use of fixed effects does not allow to control 
for time (quasi-) invariant variables, such as the characteristics of the regulatory environment 
characterizing the banking system that are part of our set of covariates.  
More formally, we estimate via a Maximum Likelihood Estimator (MLE) the following Panel 
Random-Effects logit model:  
(1) 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡{𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 (𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 1|𝑋𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−4, 𝑍𝑗,𝑡, 𝜗𝑖) = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑁𝐺𝑇𝐻𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−4 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−4 + 𝜑𝑍𝑗,𝑡 + 𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐸 + 𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑌 +
𝜗𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡,  
where SEO denotes a binary variable equal to one if the bank has issued common equity within a 
given time period, 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑁𝐺𝑇𝐻𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−4 is one of our measures of capital adequacy,  𝑋𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−4 and 𝑍𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 are, 
respectively the vector of bank characteristics and the vector of banking system and country control 
variables described in the next section, TIME is a vector of time dummies, COUNTRY a vector of 
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country dummies and 𝜗𝑖~𝑁(0, 𝜎) are the random intercepts that are assumed to be independent 
and identically distributed across banks and independent from the remaining covariates. The 
subscripts i, j, and t denote the bank, the country and the time period, respectively. Notably, as in 
Erel et al. (2012), the bank-level explanatory variables are measured at the four-quarter lag to reduce 
endogeneity concerns in the regression model.  
We estimate the models using a calendar quarter as the time unit of observation. This choice 
allows us to closely match the timing of the SEO to the time of outburst of systemic distress and 
thus control for the fact that, as discussed earlier, the disincentives/incentives by poorly capitalized 
banks to raise equity, and the related strength of regulatory and market pressures, vary with the 
degree of systemic stability. We address these concerns by estimating a quarterly indicator of 
systemic distress that we employ as a control variable. This quarterly indicator is constructed using 
the index of money market pressure suggested by von Hagen and Ho (2007). The index measures 
distress in the money market by both the changes in the money market rate and the changes in bank 
reserves. We provide details on how we compute the systemic distress index and generate the binary 
systemic crisis variable in the Appendix. The advantage of this approach over other alternatives 
suggested in the literature (see among others Kaminski and Reinhart (1999) and Laeven and 
Valencia (2013)), is that it is based on publicly available information for the cross-section of 
countries (the data are drawn from the IMF International Financial Statistics) and, more importantly, 
allows the identification of the crisis event with a quarterly frequency that leads, therefore, to a more 
precise matching with the timing of SEOs. In additional tests, which we report in the Internet 
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appendix and run with an annual frequency, we show that using Laeven and Valencia’s (2013) data 
for the definition of a crisis event generates qualitatively similar results.  
******FIGURE 1 HERE***** 
Figure 1 shows the number of countries that have suffered from a systemic crisis in a given 
quarter. Overall, we identify 34 country-quarter-crisis events. The large number of cases is 
concentrated, as predictable, in the peak of the recent global turmoil observed during the years 2008 
and 2009. Nevertheless, a substantial number of crisis quarters are also observed prior to the 2007-
2009 financial turmoil period (e.g. Argentina in Q1 2001, Mexico in Q4 1994, Russia in Q3 1998). 
We control for the timing of issuing equity around periods of systemic distress with a dummy 
variable that identifies the two quarters following the eruption of systemic crises 
(SYSTEMIC_SHOCK_2). In tests shown in the Internet appendix we also employ a dummy 
variable equal to one for the four quarters following the eruption of systemic crises.3 Finally, as the 
behavior of poorly capitalized banks might differ between normal and distress systemic conditions, 
in Section IV we extend equation (1) with interaction terms between the systemic distress dummies 
and our measures of bank capital strength described in the following section.  
C. Measures of Bank Capital Strength and Control Variables 
As shown in Panel A of Table 2, we employ in our tests two measures that signal a weak bank 
capital adequacy. The first (POORLY_CAPITALIZED) is a dummy equal to one if the bank 
                                                 
3 The time necessary to complete an SEO is about 6 weeks (Khan and Vyas (2012). All these variables, therefore, reflect a 
sufficiently long time period to implement an equity offer.  
  
12 
equity to asset ratio falls in the first quartile of the sample distribution. The second variable is a 
dummy equal to one if the bank equity to asset ratio falls in the first quartile of the sample 
distribution in a given year (POORLY_CAPITALIZED_Y). This latter variable, therefore, allows 
us to control for the possibility that the regulatory and market perception of what constitutes a 
weakly capitalized bank has changed over time. Notably, the two variables are indeed identifying 
banks with a very low degree of capital strength: the average equity ratio in the group of poorly 
capitalized banks as identified by the first (second) variable is equal to 3.44% (3.45%) while in the 
group of the remaining banks is 11.63% (11.62%). . 
******TABLE 2 HERE***** 
We control for several firm-specific and country-specific determinants of the probability to issue 
an SEO that we identify by taking into account the results from previous studies on nonfinancial 
firms (De Angelo et al.(2010) and Erel et al. (2012)) and the specificities of banks. Generally, given 
the potential role of SEOs as a tool for a rapid recapitalization, these variables are expected to 
influence the probability to issue equity by affecting the desired capital level and/or the speed of 
adjustment to this level. Variable definition and summary statistics of the full set of control variables 
are reported in Panels B and C of Table 2. 
First, we control for bank risk measured by the volatility of stock returns in a given quarter 
(RISK). This variable can exercise two opposite effects on the likelihood of an SEO. Risky banks 
are more likely to be under regulatory scrutiny and subject to a stronger market discipline that 
should increase their likelihood to issue equity as means of fast recapitalization. In a similar vein 
Berger et al. (2008) suggest that riskier banks are likely to target higher capital ratios. Nevertheless, 
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more risky banks could also show a lower likelihood to issue an SEO as they have more incentives 
to shift risk to debt-holders and are characterized by higher costs of raising equity. Two additional 
determinants capture the market-timing and life cycle effects on the decision to issue equity. The 
first variable is the relative price to book ratio (RELPTB), constructed as the price to book ratio at 
the bank level divided by the yearly average ratio observed for all the remaining domestic banks in 
our sample. According to the market timing perspective, firms tend to invest when their shares are 
overvalued. Thus, higher values of RELPTB will increase the probability of an SEO. A similar 
positive sign is expected if we interpret this variable as capturing the value of bank rents in the 
domestic market. In this latter case, banks with higher RELPTB are expected to opt for higher 
capital targets (Berger et al., 2008) with a consequent increase in the likelihood to issue. The second 
variable is the log of the number of years (YEARLISTED) a bank is listed in the stock market. 
Younger firms are deemed to rely on equity issues to support growing investments opportunities 
while more mature firms prefer to opt for internally generated financial resources (De Angelo et al. 
(2010)). 
Next, we control for the degree of profitability measured by the ratio between net income and 
total assets (ROA). We expect that more profitable banks, having the opportunity to rely on higher 
retained earnings, can adjust their equity ratios without incurring the potential negative signaling 
effect that the market generally links to equity issuance (Dahl and Shrieves (1990)). Another 
expected determinant of SEO decisions is bank size that we measure as the log transformation of 
bank total assets in millions of US dollars (SIZE). Usually, large banks are expected to benefit of 
scale economies in raising capital and of an easier access to capital markets (Dahl and Shrieves, 
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1990). Nevertheless, large banks are also characterized by lower capital targets (Berger et al.(2008)). 
It is not surprising, therefore, that recent studies achieve conflicting results on the role of bank size: 
Khan and Vyas (2014) show that large banks are more likely to issue equity while Elyasiani et al. 
(2014) conclude that the likelihood of an SEO is decreasing in asset size. 
The influence of bank funding structure is controlled for with the ratio between total deposits 
and total liabilities (DEPOSITS). This variable can exercise two opposite effects on the likelihood 
to issue equity via an SEO. A larger share of deposits might reduce monitoring on bank risk-taking 
given the presence of deposit insurance (Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2004)). Thus, more deposits 
should reduce capital targets and consequently the probability of issuing equity (Berger et al. (2008)). 
However, deposits are also a cheap source of funds for banks and thus a larger presence of this type 
of liabilities should limit bank concerns over the increasing cost of capital due to an equity issue. We 
then introduce in the model a dummy equal to one if a bank undertakes an M&A in a given quarter 
(MERGERS). We expect a positive impact of this variable on the likelihood of an SEO given the 
urgent need to raise funds to support the bank investment strategy (Berger et al. (2008)).  
Two additional variables control for the impact of government recapitalization programs during 
the most recent part of our sample period. Khan and Vyas (2014) show that US banks that received 
capital in the context of the Capital Purchase Program initiated in October 2008 have a higher 
likelihood to issue equity in the following quarters. We, therefore, add in some specifications a 
dummy (CPP) equal to one from the first quarter a US bank has entered the CPP program. In a 
similar vein, we create another dummy (RESCUE) that is equal to one for non-US banks that have 
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benefitted from public recapitalizations.4 Overall, banks that are recipients of public rescue funding 
should desire to adjust more rapidly their capital structure in response to the exposure to 
extraordinary regulatory pressures. 
The set of banking system and country characteristics includes two regulatory variables from 
Barth et al. (2004), with updated values from the Worldbank website. The first is an index that 
ranges from 0 to 3 measuring the degree of independence of the supervisory agency 
(REG_INDEPENDENCE) while the second is an index with values from 0 to 10 that captures 
the strictness of domestic regulation (REG_STRENGTH). We expect a positive coefficient for the 
first variable since more independent regulatory agencies are likely to be less prone to forbearance 
and more effective in forcing banks to quickly comply with regulation. Similarly, banks should have 
more pressures to opt for higher capital targets and to issue equity to undertake a rapid 
recapitalization under a stricter regulatory regime.  
An additional country control is the ratio between public sector debt and domestic GDP 
(PUBLIC_ DEBT). This ratio should indicate the financial capability of a country to rescue 
financial institutions when needed. Under a moral hazard framework, therefore, we should expect 
that banks operating in countries with higher PUBLIC_DEBT opt for higher capital targets with a 
consequent increase in the likelihood to issue equity. Nevertheless, it could be also the case that in 
                                                 
4 We collect data on government-funded recapitalizations from Grail Research (2009) that we complement with information from 
ProPublica (http://projects.propublica.org/bailout/list) for U.S. banks, Mediobanca (2012) for European banks, the website of the 
Japanese Deposit Insurance Fund for Japanese Banks and policy reports by Central Banks for the remaining countries in our sample. 
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countries with a higher fiscal capacity, regulators might exercise more pressure on banks to raise 
equity given the higher moral hazard incentives. We control for the degree of market power 
(MARKET_POWER) in the domestic banking market through the accounting value of bank's net 
interest revenue as a share of its interest-bearing (total earning) assets as available from Worldbank 
financial structure databases-2012 edition. Higher values should indicate less competitive pressures 
on banks and more market rents. Thus, in less competitive market we should observe a lower 
likelihood to issue equity because of the increased potential to retain earnings (Dahl and Shrieves 
(1990)). On the other hand, since banks operating in such markets have particularly high charter 
value, they could opt for higher capital targets and be more likely to recapitalize in order to avoid the 
hazard of losing their charter. Finally, we measure stock market development as the ratio between 
total shares traded on the stock market over GDP (SHARE_TRADED) from the Worldbank 
financial structure database-2012 edition. We expect a higher probability to issue equity by banks 
that are listed in more developed stock markets due to easier access conditions and lower costs of 
issuing. 
III. Are Poorly Capitalized Banks Less Likely to Issue Equity 
A. Baseline Specification 
The results on the nexus between bank capital strength and the likelihood to issue equity via an 
SEO are reported in Table 3. Initially, we estimate a parsimonious specification with 
POORLY_CAPITALIZED as a measure of capital strength and with a limited number of controls. 
Then, in column 2) we extend the number of explanatory variables to control for the influence of 
public recapitalizations during the latest part of our sample period and in column 3) we include our 
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measure of systemic conditions around the timing of the issuance. The next two columns show the 
results after removing US banks from the sample and up to the period before July 2007 to control 
for the high concentration of the SEO sample in the most recent years. In the following 
specifications we add country dummies and/or employ POORLY_CAPITALIZED_Y as an 
alternative measure of capital strength. 
******TABLE 3 HERE***** 
All the models show that the probability to issue equity via an SEO is higher when banks are 
poorly capitalized. For instance, using the results in column (1), we estimate that being in the lowest 
quartile of the sample distribution in terms of capital strength increases the annual probability to 
issue (holding all other variables at their mean values) from 5.08% to 7.16%. In essence, the 
incentives to issue equity produced by pressures related to capital requirements and market discipline 
appear more important than the disincentives from debt overhang and moral hazard.  
To further corroborate the validity of this conclusion we conduct additional tests (reported in the 
Internet Appendix) with three further measures of capital strength. The first two measures control 
for the influence of cross-country differences on our findings. They take the value of one if a bank is 
in the lowest quartile of the equity ratio distribution, respectively, in a given country, and in a given 
country and year. The third measure is the conventional equity over asset ratio. These additional 
analyses confirm in unison that banks with lower capital ratios are more likely to issue equity. 
Bank capital strength, however, is not the only significant determinant of the likelihood to raise 
equity via an SEO. For instance, the positive sign of RELPTB indicates that banks are likely to time 
their issues when their shares are overvalued (see also De Angelo et al. (2010) and Krishnan et al. 
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(2010)). Furthermore, larger banks are more likely to rely on an SEO as in Dahl and Shrieves (1990) 
confirming that these banks can achieve economies of scale when they raise capital from the stock 
market. In addition, in 7 out of 8 specifications, an increase in ROA reduces the likelihood of an 
SEO – consistently with a classic pecking order theory that banks prefer to retain internal resources 
rather than issuing equity. Further, the majority of the specifications show that more risky banks 
issue significantly more suggesting that banks might be concerned over their default risk and 
consequently tend to strengthen their capital structure when they are riskier. These conclusions are 
unchanged when we control for the effect of recapitalization via public funds in the latest part of the 
sample period. We confirm the results in Khan and Vyas (2014) of a higher probability of issuing for 
US banks joining the CPP program, but we also find a similar result for non-US banks that have 
received public support (especially when the analysis excludes the US from the sample). Finally, 
banks are more likely to issue equity in countries with a higher fiscal capacity, in countries with 
higher market rents and after the eruption of a systemic shock. 
Overall, this section shows that for poorly capitalized banks regulatory and market pressures to 
raise equity seem to prevail on the disincentives to issue related to debt overhang and moral hazard 
produced by the presence of implicit and explicit government guarantees. More generally, our results 
on the impact of numerous variables on the likelihood of an SEO suggest that the disincentives to 
issue equity are dominated even in the case when these disincentives are expected to be particularly 
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high; namely, when the banks are larger, when they operate in countries with more capability to 
adopt rescue policies or after the eruption of a systemic shock.5 
B. Is This a Story of Regulatory Pressure Due to Risk-Based Capital Requirements? 
One of the obvious explanations for our results is the presence of capital regulation. In essence, 
banks with lower capital ratios are also more likely to exhibit lower regulatory capital ratios. As a 
result, poorly capitalized banks might decide to proceed with an SEO simply because they need to 
avoid a violation of the minimum capital requirements. In this section we conduct two tests to assess 
whether poorly capitalized banks issue simply because of capital regulation. We present the results of 
these tests in Table 4. 
******TABLE 4 HERE***** 
Initially, we extend our baseline specification with the inclusion of a dummy equal to one if the 
difference between a bank’s total regulatory capital ratio (including TIER1 and TIER2 capital) and 
the domestic minimum capital requirement is in the first quartile of the sample distribution 
(REG_CONSTRAINED). Similarly, we compute REG_CONSTRAINED_Y as a dummy equal to 
one if, this difference is in the first quartile of the sample distribution in a given year. As in Ragan 
and Flannery (2008), we interpret the above dummy variables as measures of insufficient capital 
buffers and proxies of the pressure on banks to comply with capital requirements. We conjecture 
                                                 
5 Our results hold when we re-estimate the models using a pooled binomial logit model with bank-clustered standard errors as in 
previous studies and when we employ annual data to assess whether the fact that only some of the variables are observed at quarterly 
intervals affects our findings. 
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that if the influence of the equity ratio on the likelihood of an SEO is entirely driven by regulatory 
pressures stemming from capital requirements, these additional controls would enter the model with 
a positive and significant coefficient and simultaneously our key measures of capital strength not 
directly related to regulation should lose their explanatory power.6  
The second test focuses on the role of the variable POORLY_CAPITALIZED 
(POORLY_CAPITALIZED_Y) in the groups of regulatory constrained and regulatory 
unconstrained banks. Our prior is that if banks with low equity ratios do not issue when they have 
high capital buffers, their decision is simply driven by the pressure to comply with capital 
requirements.  
The results of these tests consistently indicate that the importance of bank capital strength in 
driving equity issuance is not fully explained by the presence of capital requirements - in line with 
the view that capital regulation is only of secondary importance (Gropp and Heider (2010)) and not 
binding (Allen et al. (2011), Diamond and Rajan (2000), Flannery (1994), and Myers and Rajan 
(1998)) when banks have to design their capital structure. More precisely, in spite of adding one of 
our measures of regulatory constraints (that positively influence the likelihood to issue equity in the 
stock market) as a control we still observe that banks with a lower capital ratio remain more likely to 
                                                 
6 It is worth noting that the relatively low correlation between POORLY CAPITALIZED (POORLY CAPITALIZED_Y) and 
REG_CONSTRAINED (REG_CONSTRAINED_Y), equal to 0.43 (0.45), allows us to include both variables in the same model 
without generating problems of multicollinearity. Furthermore, although we can construct the regulatory constrained variables only 
for a much smaller number of banks (equal to about 70% of the original sample), the total number of observations employed to 
conduct the test remain extremely large. 
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issue. Capital adequacy, therefore, matters even when regulatory pressure is controlled for. 
Furthermore, in the last four columns of Table 4, we find that poorly capitalized banks issue 
especially when they are not subject to any pressure to comply with capital requirements. By contrast 
POORLY_CAPITALIZED (POORLY_CAPITALIZED_Y) is not significant in the group of 
banks characterized by a low capital buffer; namely, regulatory constrained banks issue 
independently from the value of their equity ratio.  
Overall, our tests exclude the possibility that the need to comply with capital requirements is the 
only and primary driver of the decision of poorly capitalized banks to rely on an SEO and suggest 
that additional factors are also significant determinants of the bank’s decision to issue equity. In this 
sense, market discipline appears a potential, important driver of our findings. More precisely, since 
regulatory capital requirements are based on imperfect risk assessment, investors can view bank 
capital adequacy as insufficient even though the regulatory capital is well above the required 
minimum level. In other words, a decision to issue equity by poorly capitalized banks would be 
motivated by a higher likelihood to incur in bankruptcy costs given, for instance, the increasing risk-
premium required by uninsured debt-holders. Poorly capitalized banks will be then more likely to 
rely on SEOs independently from the presence of a sufficiently large regulatory capital as implied by 
the findings reported in this section. 
C. Are Poorly Capitalized Banks More Likely to Issue Equity When Capital Regulation 
Changes? 
The findings discussed above say little on how poorly capitalized banks react when they have to 
comply with changes in capital regulation that introduce more stringent capital requirements, as it is 
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the case of the recent adoption of the Basel III Accord. This is an important omission: the 
implementation of more stringent capital requirements at the country level is a fairly exogenous 
shock in regulation that allows us to offer a cleaner test on whether SEOs are motivated by 
regulatory reasons. 
In this section, we therefore explore the role of regulation using a difference-in-difference 
identification approach, based on the numerous events of regulatory changes that have generated 
more stringent capital requirements at the national level. We employ these changes as quasi-natural 
experiments to study how individual banks react to fairly exogenous changes in the required capital 
level. We argue that the changes in regulation are exogenous with respect to a bank’s SEO decision 
since they reflect either the international synchronization of capital regulation or a shift in a 
regulator’s perception of what constitutes a sufficient degree of capitalization for all banks rather 
than the undercapitalization of some specific individual banks.  
In our initial tests we study how the probability of banks to issue equity differs between affected 
and non-affected banks with regard to two types of changes in regulation occurring in our sample: i) 
the adoption for the first time of risk-based capital requirements; ii) the increase in the minimum 
regulatory capital ratio. We employ these events to construct a dummy variable (REG_CHANGE) 
equal to one for the periods following a more stringent capital regulation of type i) or ii) and zero 
otherwise. We then add this variable and its interactions to our measures of capital strength to our 
baseline specification. A detailed description of the evolution of capital regulation at the country 
level is presented in Table IA1 in the Internet Appendix. Initially we do not include in the list of 
regulatory changes the adoption of the Basel II Accord that has occurred in some of the sampled 
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countries in the latest part of the sample period. This is because Basel II was not expected to 
generate, on average, any need of additional capital for banks (Vallascas and Hagendorff (2013)) 
while we want to specifically focus on regulatory changes that are expected to produce a more 
stringent capital regime that would motivate the need to raise equity by banks.  
Overall, in our sample we observe 17 changes in regulation. A total of 13 of these changes 
happened not during a systemic crisis or the following four quarters suggesting that the changes in 
regulation are not a reaction to bank undercapitalization. We interpret this as further evidence of the 
exogeneity of regulatory changes. More precisely, five of the sampled countries (Argentina, Brazil, 
China, Russia, and Turkey) introduced risk based capital requirements for the first time during our 
sample period. However, since no banks were listed in Argentina and Russia prior to the 
introduction of risk based capital requirements, in our tests we can only capture the effects of this 
regulatory change in Brazil, China, and Turkey. Five other countries (Canada, India, Indonesia 
Republic of Korea, South Africa), which had adopted risk based capital requirements already at the 
start of our sample period, have produced subsequently six increases in the minimum required level 
of regulatory capital. Notably, the five countries that have introduced capital requirements after 1993 
have also generated six additional changes in the minimum regulatory capital ratio. Out of these 
changes four happen in Brazil, China, and Turkey and are obscured by the way we construct 
REG_CHANGE. The remaining two changes occur in Argentina and Russia in points of time when 
listed banks exist prior to the regulatory changes. These two changes are recorded in our 
REG_CHANGE variable that captures totally 10 regulatory changes.  
******TABLE 5 HERE***** 
  
24 
We report the results of described tests in Columns 1 and 2 of Table 5 where baseline 
specifications include the dummy REG_CHANGE and interaction terms of this dummy with one 
of our measures of weak capitalization. As suggested by Norton et al. (2004) in non-linear models it 
is not possible to infer the role and the degree of significance of the interaction term simply through 
the estimated coefficient and the related standard error. To circumvent this problem, we follow 
Berger and Bouwman (2013) and report in Panel B the coefficients and standard errors of the 
marginal effects of REG_CHANGE on the likelihood to issue equity by banks with different capital 
levels.  
The marginal effects reported in Panel B confirm that changes in regulation do not lead banks 
with a lower degree of capital strength to raise more equity in the stock market suggesting that 
capital regulation is unlikely to drive their equity issuance. By contrast, we find that a change in 
capital regulation increases the likelihood to issue equity by banks that do not belong to the weakly 
capitalized group. This latter result confirms that our measures of capital strength have not much to 
do with regulatory capital requirements; namely, they are not simply imperfect proxies of the 
regulatory capital ratio of banks. This is also highlighted by the results reported in column (3) based 
on REG_CONSTRAINED as a measure of capital strength. In such a case, as highlighted in Panel 
B, we find that the influence of the changes in regulation on equity issuance does not vary with the 
value of the regulatory capital buffer; namely, after a regulatory change banks do not issue more 
independently from the value of their capital buffer. In Internet appendix we show that additional 
tests that include Basel II as part of the regulatory changes confirm our main results.  
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Finally, in the last two columns of Table 5 we evaluate the possibility that poorly capitalized 
banks anticipate the regulatory change and adjust their capital adequacy earlier than other banks in 
response to a shift in regulation7. To this end, we construct a dummy equal to one for the first eight 
quarters before the change in regulation occurs that we interact with our two measures of poor 
capitalization. Again, we do not find that periods pre-regulatory changes encourage especially poorly 
capitalized banks to raise equity. We obtain similar results for the probability to issue prior to a 
capital regulation change, when we repeat the test by using REG_CONSTRAINED as a measure of 
capital strength.  
To sum up, poorly capitalized banks do not respond to changes in capital requirements by raising 
equity and they do not issue more in the proximity of regulatory changes. Furthermore, the change 
in regulation seems to open - through the raised expectations that many banks will issue an SEO - a 
window of opportunities for better capitalized banks that have been considering to increase their 
capital levels prior to the announcement of the regulatory change but feared the negative market 
reaction that is typically associated with the announcement of equity issuance. Jointly, these results 
again underline the limited role of capital regulation as a key driver of the SEO decision by poorly 
capitalized banks. 
                                                 
7 This test is based on 15 changes in capital regulation as we include also modifications in the minimum capital ratio that occurred 
after a country has implemented capital requirements during the sample period that were previously obscured by the earlier adoption 
of capital regulation. 
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IV. The Role of Bank Capital Strength on Equity Issuance Under Normal and Distress 
Systemic Conditions 
A. Does a Systemic Distress Reduce the Likelihood of Issuing Equity by Low Capitalized 
Banks? 
In this section we focus on the role of market discipline on equity issuance by examining how the 
likelihood to conduct an SEO by poorly capitalized banks varies between periods of financial system 
stability and such of systemic distress. It is a widely held view that negative systemic conditions act 
as an amplifier of poorly capitalized banks’ disincentives to issue equity given the larger losses in 
value that the issuance could generate for shareholders. These losses are not simply motivated by the 
higher costs of issuing in the presence of more unstable systemic conditions but also by the 
increasing likelihood to benefit from a government support that allows banks to transfer risks to tax-
payers (Admati, et al. (2012)).  
One additional consequence of the increasing value of implicit and explicit government 
guarantees, however, is a decline in the effectiveness of market discipline due to a lower risk-
sensitivity of uninsured bank creditors (Acharya et al. (2013), Balasubramnian and Cyree (2011), and 
Hett and Schmidt (2013)). More generally, the presence of negative systemic conditions, by reducing 
the sensitivity of investors to bank fundamentals, reduces differences in the strength of market 
discipline applied to different banks (Hasan et al. (2013), Levy-Yeyati et al. (2004) and Martinez-
Peria and Schmukler (2001)). From the highlighted theoretical arguments, it follows that if market 
discipline is the main driving force that reduces the disincentives by poorly capitalized banks to raise 
equity in the stock market, these banks should be more inclined to issue when they are deemed to be 
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subject to more stringent market discipline than other banks; namely, under normal systemic 
conditions.  
******TABLE 6 HERE***** 
We analyze the influence of bank capital strength on SEOs during systemic distress in the first 
two columns of Panel A of Table 6 where we extend the regression models reported in columns 6 
and 8 of Table 3 with the inclusion of interaction terms between our systemic shock variable and the 
two measures of bank capital strength. Panel A shows that while the measures of bank capital 
strength maintain the sign and significant level as in the baseline specification, the interaction terms 
between these measures and the systemic shock dummy enter the regression models with a negative 
and highly significant coefficient. More importantly, the marginal effects reported in Panel B indicate 
that the influence of bank capital strength on the likelihood to issue equity is only present in normal 
time. Under negative systemic conditions being a poorly capitalized bank does not increase the 
likelihood to issue. Notably, in the Internet Appendix, we show that this conclusion is confirmed 
also when we employ the alternative measures of capital strength described in Section III. 8 
                                                 
8 In unreported tests we also adjust the timing of the SEOs to take into account the period necessary to arrange the issuance and 
to achieve a more precise matching between the bank decision to raise equity and the systemic conditions. Specifically, we anticipate 
the timing of the issuance of six weeks compared with the original data, as this is considered the average time necessary to organize an 
issuance (Khan and Vyas, 2014). The above change in the timing of the SEO does not produce any change in our results. Further, we 
also repeat the analysis separately for two sub-periods 1993-June 2007 and July 2007-2011 to evaluate whether this finding depends on 
the high concentration of crisis episodes and SEOs in the latest part of our sample period. The results remain broadly in line with the 
findings obtained for the full sample period.  
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In summary, a weaker capital adequacy increases the likelihood to issue an SEO only under 
normal systemic conditions while it plays no role on equity issuance around systemic shocks. As 
these periods have been generally associated with a less effective market discipline (Acharya et al. 
(2013), Balasubramnian and Cyree (2011), Levy-Yeyati et al. (2004), and Hett and Schmidt (2013)), 
putting together the results discussed in this section with the evidence drawn from the previous 
sections, we conclude that market forces strongly influence the decisions of weakly capitalized banks 
to raise equity. When the eruption of systemic shocks reduces the effectiveness of market pressure, 
poorly capitalized banks do not behave differently from other banks. 
B. Capital Strength and Equity Issuance: Large Banks Versus Other Banks 
While we have interpreted the results discussed above as indicating that, under a systemic crisis 
the pressure on poorly capitalized banks to issue equity is reduced because of an ineffective market 
discipline motivated by the attempt of investors and banks to speculate on the increasing value of 
government guarantees, there is also another potential interpretation. This alternative interpretation 
suggests that poorly capitalized banks are subject to pressures to issue equity but they find it too 
costly under negative systemic conditions even if they would be willing to do so.   
To discriminate between the two alternative interpretations, and highlight if moral hazard via the 
attempt to speculate on the expectation to receive government support has any role on our findings, 
we conduct additional tests that are based on sub-samples of banks. Specifically, we intend to assess 
whether our results differ between banks that are likely to be perceived by investors as too-big-to-
fail and the remaining banks in our sample; namely, between groups of banks that are subject to 
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different expectations to receive government support and, at the same time, also differ in terms of 
cost of issuance.  
Our prior is that if our results are simply motivated by an increasing cost of issuance in crisis 
periods we should observe a stronger reluctance to raise equity in response to systemic shocks when 
poorly capitalized banks are small in size. This is because smaller banks are typically characterized by 
a lower likelihood to receive government support while they suffer from higher costs of raising 
equity given that a certain portion of these costs is fixed and independent from size. If the 
expectation of a government intervention is instead somehow important to motivate our findings, 
we should observe that poorly capitalized banks would be less willing to issue than other banks 
during a systemic shock also when they are large and consequently have lower cost of issuance but 
benefit of a too-big-to-fail status.  
To conduct these tests we first define large banks following Beltratti and Stulz (2012) as banks 
with a value of total assets larger than 50 US$ billion9. We report the results of these additional tests 
from columns 3 to columns 6 of Table 6. Overall, we find support for the view that the expectation 
to benefit from a government bailout is likely to play a role in discouraging poorly capitalized banks 
to raise equity in the market. Essentially, the lower probability to issue equity by poorly capitalized 
banks in crisis periods is not driven by the behavior of small banks but is also confirmed in the 
group of large banks. This is clearly highlighted in Panel B of Table 6 where the reported marginal 
effects show that while we observe that also too-big-to-fail banks remain more likely to issue equity 
                                                 
9 This size limit is also in line with the US regulatory definition of systemically important banks as stated in the 
Dodd-Frank Act of July 2010. 
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in normal times if undercapitalized, this conclusion is not confirmed during crisis periods. By 
contrast, in the presence of conditions of systemic distress, the marginal effects of our measures of 
capital strength are significantly negative in the sub-sample of large banks. Thus, in the presence of 
an increasing value of government guarantees, which typically materializes during systemic crises, 
large banks are less likely to raise equity when they show a weaker capital adequacy. In additional 
tests (reported in the Internet Appendix) we examine the robustness of the results to choosing a 
different cut-off for the definition of large banks: we generate the same qualitative results if we 
define large banks as such with total assets exceeding 100 US$ billion.  
Further, we conduct additional tests by using size measures that rely on the cross-country 
dimension of our sample and are based on the ratio between bank liabilities and country GDP. The 
motivation for using such measures is based on the evidence provided by Correa et al. (2014) 
showing that a higher ratio between bank liabilities and country GDP increases the likelihood that a 
bank receives government support. More specifically, in the Internet appendix we report the results 
based on two alternative systemic size measures: first, we define a bank as large in relative terms 
when the value of its total liabilities exceed 10% of the domestic GDP; then we alternatively identify 
banks as relatively large if their total liabilities over the GDP of the respective country in the last 
quartile of the sample distribution. These tests again confirm that our findings are not driven by 
small banks as we still find a positive and significant marginal effect of poor capitalization in normal 
times also in the group of too-big-to-fail banks. Nevertheless, during crisis periods, we now observe 
that the marginal effects are not negative and statically significant at customary levels unless we 
remove the country dummies from our specifications. Essentially, the difference in the behavior of 
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large and small banks in crisis periods appear more pronounced when size is defined in absolute 
terms. This is probably related to the fact that this latter classification better remove the 
confounding effect generated by differences in the cost of issuance than the classification based on a 
relative size measure. 
All in all, this section supports the primary conclusion of our analysis: market- discipline exercises 
a key influence on the decision of banks to issue equity when they are poorly capitalized. During 
crisis periods market discipline is, to some extent, weakened by the raising value of implicit and 
explicit government guarantees, as testified by the fact that, when poorly capitalized, banks with a 
large volume of total assets are less likely to raise equity in the quarters following a crisis while they 
remain more likely to issue in normal times. 
V. Poorly Capitalized Banks, Equity Issuance and Alternative Recapitalization 
Strategies 
SEOs are not the only tool that poorly capitalized banks can use to adjust their capital structure 
to respond to regulatory and market pressures. For instance, banks might respond to these pressures 
by accumulating retained earnings. Compared to SEOs, however, this alternative is subject to a 
lower degree of discretion that can be exercised by bank managers, as it is constrained by the level of 
profitability achieved in a given year, and requires a longer time of implementation. Hence, if the 
poor degree of capitalization signals that a bank is extremely distant from the desired capital 
structure, and has to react timely to external pressure by achieving a high speed of adjustment 
(Berger et al. (2008)), an increase in capital via retained earnings should be less likely to occur than 
an equity issuance via SEOs.  
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******TABLE 7 HERE***** 
In this section we offer evidence in line with this conjecture by extending our analysis to the 
impact of our measures of poor capital adequacy on the likelihood to observe an increase in capital 
via retained earnings. Given that the change in capital via retained earnings can be observed only at 
an annual frequency, we start by replicating our baseline specification on the likelihood of issuing 
SEOs with annual data that we then employ as our benchmark model10. Next, we estimate a similar 
model where the dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if a bank has increased capital without 
issuing new shares in a given year; namely, we model the probability that a bank increases equity by 
means of retained earnings. 
While the results reported in the first two columns of Table 7 confirm the positive nexus between 
our measures of poor capitalization and the likelihood of an SEO, we do not find any significant 
effect of these measures in columns 3 and 4 where the focus is on the probability of an increase in 
capital via retained earnings. In the next four columns we also evaluate whether poorly capitalized 
banks at least attempt to respond to their weak capital adequacy by increasing their retained earnings 
and especially if they modify the component of retained earnings that is under full managerial 
control; namely, the dividends paid to shareholders. Therefore, we initially re-estimate the logit 
                                                 
10 The annual estimation requires a mapping of the quarterly SYSTEMIC_SHOCK_2 variable to a variable with 
annual frequency. To this end, we proceed as follows: if the quarterly variable identifies a systemic distress in any of the 
first two quarters of a year, we assign the annual SYSTEMIC_SHOCK variable a value of one and zero otherwise. If the 
quarterly variable identifies a systemic distress in the third and fourth quarter of the year, we assign the annual 
SYSTEMIC_SHOCK variable a value of one in the following year. 
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models with a dummy equal to one when a bank has increased retained earnings in a given year and 
then with a dummy equal to one if it has reduced dividends in the same year. These additional tests 
do not provide evidence of a higher probability to modify the retained earnings policy and to reduce 
dividends when banks are poorly capitalized. Notably, in unreported tests we do not find any effect 
of our measures of poor capitalization also when we estimate a linear model where the dependent 
variable is the annual change in retained earnings (dividends) scaled by the volume of total assets at 
the end of the previous year. 
Overall, these tests confirm our expectation that poorly capitalized banks are not more likely than 
other banks to increase capital via retained earnings as a response to pressure to restore their capital 
strength and as an alternative to a timely recapitalization based on raising equity via SEOs.  
To further corroborate the conclusion that poorly capitalized banks are in search of a timely 
recapitalization strategy, we next examine whether these banks are also likely to implement another 
rebalancing strategy of the capital structure that allows more flexibility and a more rapid response 
than a capital increase via retained earnings. Essentially, we conjecture that if the speed of 
adjustment of the capital structure is influencing the recapitalization strategy chosen by poorly 
capitalized banks, the real alternative to SEOs is likely to be the implementation of a de-leveraging 
via a reduction in assets. Accordingly, in the last two columns, of Table 7 we show the regression 
results of our baseline logit specification where the dependent variable is a dummy equal to one in 
the case of a reduction in banks assets that we use as a proxy of a bank deleveraging strategy. 
******TABLE 8 HERE***** 
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These additional tests confirm that poorly capitalized banks are in search of a quick re-balancing 
of their capital structure: they are more likely than other banks to experiment a de-leveraging 
strategy. Nevertheless, the coefficient of the dummy POORLY_CAPITALIZED is significantly 
larger (at the 5% level) in the SEO specification (columns 1 and 2) than in the de-leveraging 
specification (columns 9 and 10). Hence, a weak capital adequacy exercises a stronger effect on the 
likelihood of an SEO than on the likelihood of a de-leveraging strategy.  
This conclusion is also confirmed by the results reported in Table 8 that refer to a multinomial 
logit model where the dependent variable is equal to zero when neither an SEO or a decline in assets 
has been observed, 1 for the issuance of an SEO and 2 for a reduction in assets in the absence of an 
SEO. Under this setting, the difference between the coefficients of POORLY_CAPITALIZED 
(POORLY_CAPITALIZED_Y) in column 1 (3) and 2 (4) expresses the likelihood that a poorly 
capitalized bank will issue an SEO rather than reducing assets. As reported in Panel B, the difference 
between the coefficients is positive and significant at customary levels; namely, poorly capitalized 
banks are more likely to issue an SEO than to implement a de-leveraging strategy. This result might 
indicate that poorly capitalized banks perceive the costs associated to a de-leveraging solution as 
significantly larger than the costs related to equity issuance.  
All in all, this section shows that a weak degree of capital adequacy not only exposes banks to 
pressure to re-balance their capital structure but also force them to opt for a timely re-balancing 
strategy with the issuance of an SEO that appears the most likely response. 
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VI. Conclusions 
Poorly capitalized banks are more likely to issue equity than other banks. The issuance does not 
appear primarily motivated by the presence of capital regulation but by the influence of market 
forces. This conclusion is supported by the fact that poorly capitalized banks are more likely to 
equity than other banks especially when they are far from the minimum regulatory capital ratio; 
namely, when they are less likely to be subject to pressure to comply with minimum capital 
requirements. Furthermore, by means of a difference-in-difference approach, we show that poorly 
capitalized banks do not react to changes in capital regulation by raising equity in the stock market 
and do not issue more than other banks even in the proximity of the implementation of these 
regulatory changes.  
Overall, we interpret the highlighted results as indicating a primary role for market discipline in 
guiding equity issuance by poorly capitalized banks. Our interpretation is further supported by 
additional tests that analyze the behavior of poorly capitalized banks in normal and distress systemic 
conditions. In the presence of a systemic shock, when investors are less sensitive to bank 
fundamentals given their expectation to be protected by government guarantees (Acharya et al. 
(2013)), poorly capitalized banks do not behave differently from other banks. However, they remain 
more likely to issue equity during normal systemic conditions when market discipline is supposed to 
be more effective. This result is not confined to small banks. By contrast, when poorly capitalized 
banks are also large in absolute terms, with a consequent largest chance to receive government 
support, they tend to be more likely to raise equity in normal times and less likely to do so after a 
systemic shock.  
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Finally, the analysis of other strategies that can be employed to adjust bank capital structure 
shows that poorly capitalized banks are not only exposed to pressure to re-balance their capital 
structure but they also opt for a re-balancing strategy that reduces the time of adjustment. This 
conclusion is confirmed by the fact that for poorly capitalized banks the alternative to SEOs is de- 
leveraging, which allows for a faster adjustment, rather than the increase in capital via retained 
earnings that can only slowly re-balance their capital structure. Nevertheless, the issuance of an SEO 
remains the most likely response by banks with a poor degree of capitalization.  
The findings discussed here suggest that minimum mandatory requirements on default-risk 
sensitive forms of debt, such as subordinated debts or types of contingent capital, can generate 
incentives for equity issuance by banks. This might occur via an increase in bankruptcy costs for 
shareholders in the form of significantly higher funding costs motivated by a market-discipline 
channel. Furthermore, our results motivate the introduction of countercyclical capital buffer and 
forms of contingent capital specifically designed, and stringent, for large banks.  
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Table 1: Distribution of Banks and SEOs  
Panel A: Distribution of Bank and SEOs by year  
 Number of Banks  Number of SEOs SEOs/Banks 
1993 751 33 4.39 
1994 841 39 4.64 
1995 907 27 2.98 
1996 1045 25 2.39 
1997 1130 28 2.48 
1998 1124 41 3.65 
1999 1105 34 2.99 
2000 1073 17 1.58 
2001 1040 43 4.13 
2002 1011 34 3.36 
2003 1003 34 3.39 
2004 975 43 4.41 
2005 979 59 6.03 
2006 955 58 6.07 
2007 926 43 4.64 
2008 900 72 8.00 
2009 878 132 15.03 
2010 845 131 15.50 
2011 Q2 121 19 15.70 
Total  17509 912 5.20 
Panel B: Distribution of SEOs by country    
 Number of SEOs %  SEOs 
Average Proceed 
(BLN US$) 
Argentina 3 0.33 64.1 
Australia 42 4.61 233.7 
Brazil 28 3.07 1093.2 
Canada 14 1.54 224.8 
China 48 5.26 1530.4 
France 18 1.97 1294.2 
Germany 35 3.84 764.8 
India 38 4.17 205.5 
Indonesia 58 6.36 213.4 
Italy 52 5.70 425.0 
Japan 70 7.68 399.8 
Mexico 0 0.00 223.8 
Russia 10 1.10 254.1 
Saudi Arabia 2 0.22 1113.9 
South Africa 2 0.22 272.7 
Republic of Korea 26 2.85 214.0 
Turkey 8 0.88 172.7 
UK 29 3.18 1053.5 
USA 429 47.04 260.6 
Total 912 100.00 490.0 
 
 
 Table 2: Variable Definition and Summary Statistics  
  N Mean Median St. Dev. 1 Pctile 99 Pctile 
Panel A: Measures of Bank Capital Strength        
POORLY_CAPITALIZED Dummy equal to one if a bank is in the first quartile of equity to assets distribution 53707 0.257 0.000 0.437 0.000 1.000 
POORLY_CAPITALIZED_Y Dummy equal to one if a bank is in the first quartile of equity to assets distribution in a given year 53707 0.256 0.000 0.436 0.000 1.000 
Panel B: Bank-Specific Controls 
      
RISK Standard deviation of daily returns computed at quarterly intervals 53707 0.057 0.043 0.051 0.009 0.259 
RELPTB Price to book ratio divided by the average Price to book ratio computed yearly at country level 53707 1.020 0.930 0.571 0.241 2.826 
YEARLISTED Number of years a bank is listed in the stock market  53707 11.472 10.000 8.234 1.000 35.000 
SIZE Log of total assets in millions of U.S. dollars 53707 7.933 7.541 2.110 4.240 13.502 
ROA Net income over total assets  53659 0.007 0.008 0.026 -0.051 0.047 
DEPOSITS Ratio between total deposits and total liabilities  50436 0.790 0.844 0.203 0.102 1.127 
MERGERS Dummy equal to one if a bank has undertaken a merger in a given quarter  53707 0.012 0.000 0.109 0.000 1.000 
CPP Dummy equal to one from the first quarter after capital injection via the Capital Purchase Program 53707 0.034 0.000 0.182 0.000 1.000 
RESCUE Dummy equal to one from the first quarter after a non-US bank has received capital support 53707 0.003 0.000 0.055 0.000 1.000 
Panel C: Country-Specific Controls  
REG_INDEPENDENCE Index assessing the degree of independence of the supervisory agency. The index ranges from 0 to 3 
with higher value denoting a more independent supervisory agency. The indicator is constructed 
based on the following three questions. 1. Can the head of the supervisory agency can be removed by 
either [(a) the decision of the head of government (e.g. President, Prime Minister), Finance Minister 
or other cabinet level authority, a simple majority of a legislative body (Parliament or Congress), a 
supermajority (e.g., 60%, 75%) of a legislative body]; 2. Are the supervisors legally liable for their 
actions (i.e. if a supervisor takes actions against a bank, the supervisor cannot be sued) (No=1)?; 3. 
Does the head of the supervisory agency (and other directors) have a fixed term and how long? (=1 if 
the term>=4). Higher value means a more independent supervisory agency. From Barth et al. (2004) 
with updated values from the Worldbank website 
53707 2.355 3.000 1.052 0.000 3.000 
REG_STRENGHT Index that ranges from zero to ten and is based on the following questions: (1) Does the supervisory 
agency have the right to meet with external auditors to discuss reports without the approval of the 
bank? (2) Are the auditors required to communicate misconduct by managers/directors to the 
supervisory agency? (3) Can legal action against external auditors be taken by supervisors for 
negligence? (4) Can supervisors force banks to change the internal organizational structure? (5) Are 
off-balance sheet items disclosed to supervisors? (6) Can the supervisory agency order 
directors/management to constitute provisions to cover actual/potential losses? (7) Can the 
supervisory agency suspends director’s decisions to distribute: (a) Dividends? (b) Bonuses? (c) 
Management fees? (8) Can the supervisory agency supersede bank shareholder rights and declare a 
bank insolvent? (9) Does banking law allow the supervisory agency to suspend some or all ownership 
rights of a problem bank? (10) Regarding bank restructuring and reorganization, can the supervisory 
agency or any other government agency do the following: (a) Suspend shareholder rights? (b) Remove 
and replace management? (c) Remove and replace directors? From Barth et al. (2004) with updated 
values from the Worldbank website. 
53707 8.434 9.000 1.189 5.000 10.000 
PUBLIC_DEBT  Ratio between Public Sector Debt and Country GDP (in %) 53707 74.078 64.900 36.166 10.700 210.200 
SHARE_TRADED Total shares traded on the stock market over GDP from Worldbank financial structure databases-
2012 edition 52657 152.484 
133.859 109.977 6.131 401.233 
MARKET_POWER Accounting value of bank's net interest revenue as a share of its interest-bearing (total earning) assets 
from Worldbank financial structure databases-2012 edition 
52657 2.244 2.697 1.128 0.020 5.718 
SYSTEMIC_SHOCK_2 A dummy equal to one for the first two quarters after the eruption of a systemic shock identified as in 
Von Hagen and Ho (2007) 
53707 0.041 0.000 0.201 0.000 1.000 
 Table 3: Probability of Issuing Equity and Bank Capital Strength  
This Table shows the regression results on the determinants of the likelihood to issue equity by banks. The models are estimated via a Panel Random 
Logit estimator that controls for unobserved bank heterogeneity. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if a bank has issued equity in a given 
quarter and zero otherwise while the explanatory variables include bank and country characteristics. POORLY_CAPITALIZED is a dummy equal to 
one if a bank is in the first quartile of the equity/assets distribution, POORLY_CAPITALIZED_Y is a dummy equal to one if a bank is in the first 
quartile of the yearly equity/assets distribution, RISK is the volatility of the daily prices computed over the last quarter before the issue, RELPTB is 
Price to book ratio divided by the average Price to book ratio computed yearly at country level, ROA is the ratio between net income and total assets; 
YEARLISTED is the log of the number of years a bank has been listed in stock market, SIZE is the log of total assets measured in thousands of US 
dollars, DEPOSITS is computed as total customer deposits over total liabilities and MERGERS is a dummy equal to 1 if a bank has been involved in a 
merger during the quarter, CPP is a dummy equal to one from the first quarter after a US bank has received capital support via the Capital Purchase 
Program, RESCUE is a dummy equal to one from the first quarter a non-US bank has received capital support . Country controls includes an index of 
regulatory independence (REG_INDEPENDENCE), an index measuring the regulatory strength (REG_STRENGHT), the ratio between public 
sector debt and country GDP (PUBLIC_DEBT) the total shares traded divided country GDP (SHARE TRADED), the total accounting value of 
bank's net interest revenue as a share of its interest-bearing (total earning) assets (MARKET POWER), a dummy equal to one for the first two quarters 
following a systemic shock (SYSTEMIC_SHOCK_2). Standard errors are reported in round brackets in parentheses *** (**,*) indicates significance at 
the 1(5,10) percent level. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  + Rescue 
Dummies 
+Systemic 
Shock 
Ex US Before 
07/2007 
+Country 
Dummies 
Alternative  
POORLY  
CAPITALIZED 
POORLY_CAPITALIZED 0.505*** 0.544*** 0.535*** 0.425*** 0.608*** 0.597***   
 (0.111) (0.110) (0.110) (0.148) (0.144) (0.116)   
POORLY_CAPITALIZED_Y       0.525*** 0.606*** 
       (0.109) (0.116) 
RISK 2.361*** 1.525** 1.833*** 0.735 1.626 1.587** 1.869*** 1.572** 
 (0.599) (0.629) (0.625) (1.070) (1.079) (0.638) (0.622) (0.638) 
RELPTB 0.143*** 0.188*** 0.192*** 0.119* 0.210*** 0.196*** 0.192*** 0.196*** 
 (0.047) (0.044) (0.045) (0.067) (0.071) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) 
ROA -7.875*** -6.599*** -6.403*** -3.805 -6.825** -6.789*** -6.300*** -6.792*** 
 (1.518) (1.676) (1.701) (2.624) (3.025) (1.788) (1.692) (1.783) 
YEARLISTED -0.009 -0.012** -0.012** -0.000 -0.027*** -0.012** -0.012** -0.012** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
SIZE 0.354*** 0.332*** 0.330*** 0.270*** 0.292*** 0.361*** 0.325*** 0.361*** 
 (0.032) (0.031) (0.031) (0.047) (0.042) (0.033) (0.031) (0.033) 
DEPOSITS 0.528* 0.461 0.443 0.415 0.113 1.152*** 0.454 1.174*** 
 (0.294) (0.290) (0.289) (0.360) (0.361) (0.347) (0.289) (0.347) 
MERGERS 0.365 0.423 0.435 0.640* 0.844*** 0.418 0.427 0.412 
 (0.272) (0.272) (0.272) (0.361) (0.287) (0.272) (0.272) (0.272) 
CPP  1.434*** 1.352***   1.280*** 1.378*** 1.286*** 
  (0.156) (0.156)   (0.158) (0.156) (0.158) 
RESCUE  0.627* 0.557 0.952***  0.564* 0.525 0.559 
  (0.336) (0.340) (0.359)  (0.341) (0.339) (0.341) 
REG_INDEPENDENCE 0.131* 0.130* 0.172** 0.288*** 0.122 -0.501** 0.182** -0.486* 
 (0.074) (0.071) (0.072) (0.084) (0.090) (0.252) (0.071) (0.252) 
REG_STRENGHT -0.013 0.004 0.010 0.104** 0.070 0.238*** 0.018 0.238*** 
 (0.048) (0.046) (0.046) (0.048) (0.057) (0.090) (0.046) (0.090) 
PUBLIC_DEBT -0.004** -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.002 -0.006*** -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
SHARE_TRADED 0.002*** 0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
MARKET POWER 0.219*** 0.173*** 0.174*** 0.055 -0.003 0.110** 0.132*** 0.101** 
 (0.055) (0.054) (0.053) (0.047) (0.047) (0.050) (0.044) (0.050) 
SYSTEMIC_SHOCK_2   0.837*** 0.498** 0.964*** 0.903*** 0.841*** 0.898*** 
   (0.165) (0.240) (0.311) (0.169) (0.164) (0.169) 
CONSTANT -8.642*** -8.047*** -8.120*** -7.321*** -7.643*** -8.907*** -7.955*** -8.924*** 
 (0.568) (0.552) (0.554) (0.653) (0.683) (1.124) (0.539) (1.121) 
Year dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummies  No No No No No Yes No Yes 
Pseudo-R-squared 0.332 0.339 0.342 0.425 0.360 0.347 0.342 0.347 
Observations 49,872 49,872 49,872 17,147 39,419 49,872 49,872 49,872 
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Table 4: Probability of Issuing Equity and Capital Requirements 
This Table shows the regression results on the determinants of the likelihood to issue equity by banks in relation to their regulatory capital 
position. The models are estimated via a Panel Random Logit estimator that controls for unobserved bank heterogeneity. The dependent variable 
is a dummy equal to 1 if a bank has issued equity in a given quarter and zero otherwise while the explanatory variables include bank and country 
characteristics. POORLY_CAPITALIZED is a dummy equal to one if a bank is in the first quartile of the equity/assets distribution, POORLY, 
CAPITALIZED_Y is a dummy equal to one if a bank is in the first quartile of the yearly equity/assets distribution, REG_CHANGE is a dummy 
equal to one from the quarter when a country has experimented a regulatory change in capital regulation; REG_CONSTRAINED is a dummy equal to one 
for banks in the first quartile of the sample distribution in terms of regulatory capital buffer; REG_CONSTRAINED_Y is a dummy equal to one for 
banks in the first quartile of the sample distribution in a given year in terms of regulatory capital buffer; RELPTB is Price to book ratio divided by the 
average Price to book ratio computed yearly at country level, RISK is the volatility of the daily prices computed over the last quarter before the issue, 
ROA is the ratio between net income and total assets; YEARLISTED is the log of the number of years a bank has been listed in stock market, 
SIZE is the log of total assets measured in thousands of US dollars, DEPOSITS is computed as total customer deposits over total liabilities and 
MERGERS is a dummy equal to 1 if a bank has been involved in a merger during the quarter. Country controls includes an index of regulatory 
independence (REG_INDEPENDENCE), an index measuring the regulatory strength (REG_STRENGHT), the ratio between public sector 
debt and country GDP (PUBLIC_DEBT) the total shares traded divided country GDP (SHARE TRADED) and the total accounting value of 
bank's net interest revenue as a share of its interest-bearing (total earning) assets (MARKET POWER), a dummy equal to one for the first two 
quarters following a systemic shock (SYSTEMIC_SHOCK_2). Standard errors are reported in round brackets in parentheses *** (**,*) indicates 
significance at the 1(5,10) percent level. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
   REG_CONSTRAINED 
   YES NO YES NO 
POORLY_CAPITALIZED 0.333**  0.216 0.407**   
 (0.136)  (0.191) (0.182)   
POORLY_CAPITALIZED_Y  0.338**   0.303 0.468*** 
  (0.137)   (0.186) (0.177) 
REG_CONSTRAINED 0.281***      
 (0.108)      
REG_CONSTRAINED_Y  0.401***     
  (0.106)     
RISK 1.149 1.136 0.054 1.616* 0.065 1.590* 
 (0.717) (0.717) (1.426) (0.835) (1.421) (0.837) 
RELPTB 0.204*** 0.208*** 0.141 0.234*** 0.144 0.229*** 
 (0.048) (0.049) (0.096) (0.062) (0.095) (0.062) 
ROA -8.203*** -7.788*** -10.840** -6.806** -10.323** -6.603* 
 (2.775) (2.797) (4.914) (3.429) (4.947) (3.420) 
YEARLISTED -0.006 -0.006 -0.023** -0.004 -0.023** -0.004 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.012) (0.007) (0.011) (0.007) 
SIZE 0.310*** 0.311*** 0.217*** 0.328*** 0.209*** 0.340*** 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.061) (0.042) (0.060) (0.042) 
DEPOSITS 0.868** 0.858** 0.202 0.961* 0.310 0.856* 
 (0.424) (0.427) (0.684) (0.509) (0.684) (0.507) 
MERGERS 0.205 0.199 0.428 0.067 0.421 0.049 
 (0.332) (0.333) (0.527) (0.427) (0.528) (0.427) 
CPP 1.004*** 0.996*** 0.723** 1.029*** 0.713** 1.058*** 
 (0.156) (0.156) (0.343) (0.180) (0.341) (0.181) 
RESCUE 0.705** 0.739** 1.079** 0.319 1.061** 0.438 
 (0.343) (0.343) (0.460) (0.506) (0.458) (0.507) 
REG_INDEPENDENCE 0.912*** 0.887*** 1.116*** 0.908*** -0.767** 1.131 
 (0.188) (0.187) (0.346) (0.230) (0.316) (1.054) 
REG STRENGHT 1.193 1.199 -0.683** 1.050 0.184 -0.153 
 (1.045) (1.044) (0.327) (1.053) (0.131) (0.139) 
PUBLIC_DEBT 0.079 0.049 0.132 0.103 0.006 0.008 
 (0.110) (0.111) (0.142) (0.201) (0.007) (0.005) 
SHARE_TRADED 0.007* 0.006 0.005 0.011** -0.000 0.002 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.002) (0.001) 
MARKET POWER 0.002* 0.002** -0.000 0.002 0.176 0.174 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.150) (0.114) 
SYSTEMIC_SHOCK_2 0.229** 0.224** 0.128 0.318** 1.123*** 0.884*** 
 (0.103) (0.102) (0.165) (0.138) (0.346) (0.229) 
CONSTANT -13.041*** -12.826*** -4.527*** -13.765*** -5.057*** -11.131*** 
 (3.343) (3.346) (1.586) (3.743) (1.479) (3.453) 
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Pseudo R-Squared 0.488 0.489 0.216 0.258 0217 0.258 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 32,786 32,786 8,614 24,172 8,614 24,172 
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Table 5: Probability of Issuing Equity and Changes in Capital Regulation 
This Table shows the regression results on the determinants of the likelihood to issue equity by banks in response to regulatory changes. The 
models are estimated via a Panel Random Logit estimator that controls for unobserved bank heterogeneity. The dependent variable is a dummy 
equal to 1 if a bank has issued equity in a given quarter and zero otherwise while the explanatory variables include bank and country 
characteristics. POORLY_CAPITALIZED is a dummy equal to one if a bank is in the first quartile of the equity/assets distribution, 
POORLY_CAPITALIZED_Y is a dummy equal to one if a bank is in the first quartile of the yearly equity/assets distribution, 
REG_CONSTRAINED is a dummy equal to one for banks in the first quartile of the sample distribution in terms of regulatory capital buffer; 
REG_CHANGE is a dummy equal to one from the quarter when a country has experimented a regulatory change in capital regulation; 
PRE_REG_CHANGE is a dummy equal to one for from eight quarters before up to the implementation of the regulatory change, RELPTB is Price to 
book ratio divided by the average Price to book ratio computed yearly at country level, RISK is the volatility of the daily prices computed over the last 
quarter before the issue, ROA is the ratio between net income and total assets; YEARLISTED is the log of the number of years a bank has been 
listed in stock market, SIZE is the log of total assets measured in thousands of US dollars, DEPOSITS is computed as total customer deposits 
over total liabilities and MERGERS is a dummy equal to 1 if a bank has been involved in a merger during the quarter. Country controls includes 
an index of regulatory independence (REG_INDEPENDENCE), an index measuring the regulatory strength (REG_STRENGHT), the ratio 
between public sector debt and country GDP (PUBLIC_DEBT) the total shares traded divided country GDP (SHARE TRADED) and the total 
accounting value of bank's net interest revenue as a share of its interest-bearing (total earning) assets (MARKET POWER), a dummy equal to 
one for the first two quarters following a systemic shock (SYSTEMIC_SHOCK_2). Standard errors are reported in round brackets in 
parentheses *** (**,*) indicates significance at the 1(5,10) percent level. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Panel A: Regression Analysis      
POORLY_CAPITALIZED 0.796***   0.526***  
 (0.134)   (0.118)  
POORLY_CAPITALIZED_Y  0.746***   0.530*** 
  (0.134)   (0.117) 
REG_CONSTRAINED   0.448***   
   (0.121)   
REG_CHANGE 0.645*** 0.586*** 0.335*   
 (0.169) (0.169) (0.181)   
REG_CHANGE* POORLY_CAPITALIZED -0.705***     
 (0.203)     
REG_CHANGE* POORLY_CAPITALIZED_Y  -0.587***    
  (0.203)    
REG_CHANGE* REG_CONSTRAINED   -0.265   
   (0.208)   
PRE_REG_CHANGE    0.661 0.783* 
    (0.486) (0.474) 
PRE_REG_CHANGE* POORLY_CAPITALIZED    0.174  
    (0.639)  
PRE_REG_CHANGE* POORLY_CAPITALIZED_Y     -0.121 
     (0.620) 
RISK 0.923 0.914 1.195* 0.948 0.935 
 (0.656) (0.655) (0.715) (0.654) (0.653) 
RELPTB 0.189*** 0.189*** 0.211*** 0.186*** 0.186*** 
 (0.045) (0.045) (0.048) (0.045) (0.045) 
ROA -6.095*** -6.154*** -9.194*** -6.137*** -6.138*** 
 (1.780) (1.768) (2.693) (1.877) (1.870) 
YEARLISTED -0.011* -0.011* -0.007 -0.010 -0.010 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
SIZE 0.344*** 0.344*** 0.306*** 0.345*** 0.345*** 
 (0.032) (0.032) (0.036) (0.033) (0.033) 
DEPOSITS 1.169*** 1.188*** 0.788* 1.187*** 1.204*** 
 (0.338) (0.338) (0.422) (0.340) (0.340) 
MERGERS 0.416 0.403 0.205 0.420 0.412 
 (0.273) (0.273) (0.332) (0.272) (0.272) 
CPP 1.088*** 1.108*** 0.984*** 1.148*** 1.153*** 
 (0.153) (0.153) (0.155) (0.154) (0.154) 
RESCUE 0.659* 0.621* 0.587* 0.660** 0.656* 
 (0.350) (0.350) (0.356) (0.337) (0.337) 
REG_INDEPENDENCE 0.642*** 0.634*** 0.671*** 0.584*** 0.593*** 
 (0.180) (0.181) (0.239) (0.182) (0.183) 
REG STRENGHT 0.164* 0.166* 0.055 0.221** 0.219** 
 (0.091) (0.091) (0.114) (0.090) (0.090) 
PUBLIC_DEBT 0.002 0.002 0.006 0.004 0.004 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
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SHARE_TRADED 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.002* 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
MARKET POWER -0.018 -0.016 0.217** 0.054 0.055 
 (0.046) (0.045) (0.106) (0.047) (0.045) 
SYSTEMIC_SHOCK_2 0.747*** 0.747*** 0.908*** 0.774*** 0.768*** 
 (0.169) (0.169) (0.187) (0.172) (0.172) 
CONSTANT -15.321*** -15.234*** -13.422*** -14.919*** -14.908*** 
 (3.246) (3.244) (3.354) (3.249) (3.246) 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.427 0.428 0.130 0.430 0.430 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 49,872 49,872 32,786 49,872 49,872 
Panel B: Marginal effects of Regulatory changes by strength of capital adequacy    
A. POORLY_CAPITALIZED=1 -0.001 -0.000 0.002 0.023 0.017 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.018) (0.015) 
B. POORLY_CAPITALIZED=0 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.005 0.010 0.013 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.010) (0.011) 
A=B ( differences in margins p-value) 0.00*** 0.01** 0.20 0.79 0.85 
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Table 6: Probability of Issuing Equity and Systemic Conditions 
This Table shows the regression results on the determinants of the likelihood to issue equity by banks contingent on systemic conditions. The models are estimated via a Panel 
Random Logit estimator that controls for unobserved bank heterogeneity. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if a bank has issued equity in a given quarter and zero 
otherwise while the explanatory variables include bank and country characteristics. POORLY_CAPITALIZED is a dummy equal to one if a bank is in the first quartile of the 
equity/assets distribution, POORLY_CAPITALIZED_Y is a dummy equal to one if a bank is in the first quartile of the yearly equity/assets distribution, RISK is the volatility 
of the daily prices computed over the last quarter before the issue, RELPTB is Price to book ratio divided by the average Price to book ratio computed yearly at country level, 
ROA is the ratio between net income and total assets; YEARLISTED is the log of the number of years a bank has been listed in stock market, SIZE is the log of total assets 
measured in thousands of US dollars, DEPOSITS is computed as total customer deposits over total liabilities and MERGERS is a dummy equal to 1 if a bank has been 
involved in a merger during the quarter, CPP is a dummy equal to one from the first quarter after a US bank has received capital support via the Capital Purchase Program, 
RESCUE is a dummy equal to one from the first quarter a non-US bank has received capital support . Country controls includes an index of regulatory independence 
(REG_INDEPENDENCE), an index measuring the regulatory strength (REG_STRENGHT), the ratio between public sector debt and country GDP (PUBLIC_DEBT) the 
total shares traded divided country GDP (SHARE TRADED) and the total accounting value of bank's net interest revenue as a share of its interest-bearing (total earning) 
assets (MARKET POWER), a dummy equal to one for the first two quarters following a systemic shock (SYSTEMIC_SHOCK_2). Standard errors are reported in round 
brackets in parentheses *** (**,*) indicates significance at the 1(5,10) percent level. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Full Sample Large Banks  Other Banks 
Panel A: Regression Analysis       
POORLY_CAPITALIZED 0.621***  0.622***  0.595***  
 (0.117)  (0.210)  (0.149)  
POORLY_CAPITALIZED_Y  0.602***  0.683***  0.550*** 
  (0.116)  (0.209)  (0.148) 
SYSTEMIC_SHOCK_2* POORLY_CAPITALIZED -0.764**  -1.916***  -0.580  
 (0.325)  (0.653)  (0.380)  
SYSTEMIC_SHOCK_2 * 
POORLY_CAPITALIZED_Y 
 -0.568*  -1.654***  -0.366 
  (0.314)  (0.615)  (0.373) 
RISK 1.002 0.978 1.923 1.859 1.862** 1.856** 
 (0.655) (0.655) (1.253) (1.253) (0.752) (0.751) 
RELPTB 0.187*** 0.186*** 0.127* 0.125* 0.283*** 0.282*** 
 (0.045) (0.045) (0.067) (0.066) (0.066) (0.066) 
ROA -6.346*** -6.372*** -5.955** -6.015** -5.501** -5.635** 
 (1.847) (1.838) (2.329) (2.345) (2.762) (2.742) 
YEARLISTED -0.010* -0.010* 0.004 0.004 -0.031*** -0.031*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) 
SIZE 0.355*** 0.356*** 0.241*** 0.240*** 0.351*** 0.352*** 
 (0.032) (0.032) (0.060) (0.060) (0.047) (0.047) 
DEPOSITS 1.144*** 1.162*** 1.417** 1.456** 0.720* 0.722* 
 (0.339) (0.339) (0.653) (0.655) (0.406) (0.406) 
MERGERS 0.404 0.401 0.247 0.238 0.490 0.484 
 (0.273) (0.272) (0.486) (0.486) (0.332) (0.332) 
CPP 1.154*** 1.161*** 1.126*** 1.127*** 0.920*** 0.925*** 
 (0.155) (0.155) (0.285) (0.284) (0.182) (0.182) 
RESCUE 0.810** 0.784** 0.785** 0.757** 0.376 0.380 
 (0.335) (0.336) (0.378) (0.377) (1.061) (1.061) 
REG_INDEPENDENCE 1.314 1.310 -2.102*** -2.078*** 0.270 0.262 
 (1.039) (1.038) (0.425) (0.426) (0.314) (0.314) 
REG_STRENGHT 0.139* 0.141* 0.221* 0.229* 0.168 0.163 
 (0.077) (0.077) (0.134) (0.133) (0.114) (0.114) 
PUBLIC_DEBT 0.002 0.002 -0.006 -0.005 0.011*** -0.011*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) 
SHARE_TRADED 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003** 0.003** -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
MARKET POWER 0.015 0.008 0.137 0.120 0.011 0.004 
 (0.041) (0.041) (0.123) (0.125) (0.052) (0.051) 
SYSTEMIC_SHOCK_2 0.989*** 0.931*** 1.278*** 1.232*** 1.248*** 1.186*** 
 (0.200) (0.201) (0.370) (0.379) (0.241) (0.241) 
Constant -14.170*** -14.158*** -3.200* -3.335* -9.739*** -9.639*** 
 (3.230) (3.228) (1.874) (1.874) (1.422) (1.418) 
Pseudo R-squared 0.429 0.429 0.516 0.516 0.281 0.281 
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Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 49,868 49,868 6,242 6,242 43,630 43,630 
Panel B: Marginal effects of low capitalized on the likelihood to issue equity under different systemic conditions    
A) Systemic distress -0.003 0.001 -0.061** -0.048* 0.001 0.005 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.029) (0.029) 0.009 (0.010) 
B) Normal systemic conditions 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.022*** 0.024*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.008) (0.008) (0.002) (0.002) 
A=B (test of differences in margins  – p-value) 0.02** 0.07* 0.00*** 0.08* 0.11 0.48 
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Table 7: Probability of Issuing Equity versus other recapitalization strategies 
This Table shows the regression results on the determinants of the likelihood to issue equity and to adopt other recapitalization strategies by banks. The models are 
estimated via a Panel Random Logit estimator that controls for unobserved bank heterogeneity. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if a bank has issued equity in 
a given year and zero otherwise while the explanatory variables include bank and country characteristics. POORLY_CAPITALIZED is a dummy equal to one if a bank is in 
the first quartile of the equity/assets distribution, POORLY_CAPITALIZED_Y is a dummy equal to one if a bank is in the first quartile of the yearly equity/assets 
distribution, RISK is the volatility of the daily prices computed over the last quarter of the preceding year, RELPTB is Price to book ratio divided by the average Price to 
book ratio computed yearly at country level, ROA is the ratio between net income and total assets; YEARLISTED is the log of the number of years a bank has been listed 
in stock market, SIZE is the log of total assets measured in thousands of US dollars, DEPOSITS is computed as total customer deposits over total liabilities and 
MERGERS is a dummy equal to 1 if a bank has been involved in a merger during the year, CPP is a dummy equal to one from the first year after a US bank has received 
capital support via the Capital Purchase Program, RESCUE is a dummy equal to one from the first year a non-US bank has received capital support . Country controls 
includes an index of regulatory independence (REG_INDEPENDENCE), an index measuring the regulatory strength (REG_STRENGHT), the ratio between public 
sector debt and country GDP (PUBLIC_DEBT) the total shares traded divided country GDP (SHARE TRADED) and the total accounting value of bank's net interest 
revenue as a share of its interest-bearing (total earning) assets (MARKET POWER), a dummy equal to one for the period following a systemic shock 
(SYSTEMIC_SHOCK). Standard errors are reported in round brackets in parentheses *** (**,*) indicates significance at the 1(5,10) percent level. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 SEOs Increase in Equity 
without SEOs 
Increase in Retained 
Earnings 
Decrease in Dividends Decrease in Assets 
POORLY_CAPITALIZED 0.658***  0.134  -0.033  0.039  0.360***  
 (0.131)  (0.091)  (0.069)  (0.086)  (0.092)  
POORLY_CAPITALIZED_Y  0.648***  0.077  -0.067  0.081  0.447*** 
  (0.130)  (0.090)  (0.068)  (0.085)  (0.092) 
RISK 1.612** 1.622** -1.679*** -1.663*** 0.769 0.779 -1.401*** -1.442*** 2.236*** 2.210*** 
 (0.749) (0.748) (0.546) (0.545) (0.482) (0.482) (0.527) (0.525) (0.574) (0.575) 
RELPTB 0.218*** 0.218*** 0.109** 0.110** 0.233*** 0.234*** -0.298*** -0.290*** -0.464*** -0.468*** 
 (0.053) (0.053) (0.046) (0.047) (0.040) (0.040) (0.051) (0.051) (0.063) (0.063) 
ROA -6.652*** -6.679*** 3.871** 3.777** -29.412*** -29.674*** -4.368*** -4.308***  -19.181*** -18.886*** 
 (2.160) (2.150) (1.584) (1.577) (2.601) (2.605) (1.476) (1.467) (2.412) (2.396) 
YEARLISTED -0.018*** -0.019*** 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.016*** 0.017*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
SIZE 0.379*** 0.379*** -0.176*** -0.175*** 0.031* 0.031* -0.010 -0.003 -0.028 -0.030 
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.033) (0.033) (0.016) (0.016) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) 
DEPOSITS 1.120*** 1.142*** 1.005*** 0.998*** 0.739*** 0.737*** -1.098*** -1.072*** -1.863*** -1.855*** 
 (0.379) (0.379) (0.230) (0.230) (0.148) (0.148) (0.197) (0.197) (0.209) (0.210) 
MERGERS 0.254 0.253 -0.173 -0.174 0.206 0.206 -0.160 -0.069 0.232 0.232 
 (0.368) (0.368) (0.227) (0.227) (0.192) (0.192) (0.242) (0.237) (0.239) (0.239) 
CPP 1.227*** 1.231*** -0.894*** -0.895*** -1.097*** -1.099*** 1.626*** 1.614*** 1.230*** 1.242*** 
 (0.171) (0.170) (0.136) (0.136) (0.113) (0.113) (0.123) (0.123) (0.153) (0.153) 
RESCUE 0.616 0.608 -0.966** -0.967** -0.063 -0.058 1.463*** 1.397*** 0.221 0.214 
 (0.405) (0.405) (0.440) (0.440) (0.296) (0.296) (0.338) (0.336) (0.369) (0.369) 
REG_INDEPENDENCE 2.097* 2.108* 1.207** 1.216** 1.072*** 1.073*** -3.046*** -2.995*** 0.166 0.162 
 (1.077) (1.076) (0.572) (0.572) (0.303) (0.303) (0.360) (0.360) (0.461) (0.463) 
REG_STRENGHT 0.169* 0.171* 0.219*** 0.219*** -0.043 -0.043 0.180*** 0.191*** -0.508*** -0.511*** 
 (0.102) (0.102) (0.069) (0.069) (0.053) (0.053) (0.060) (0.059) (0.069) (0.069) 
PUBLIC_DEBT -0.006** -0.006** 0.005*** 0.005*** -0.014*** -0.014*** 0.006*** 0.006*** -0.017*** -0.017*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
SHARE_TRADED 0.003*** 0.003*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
MARKET POWER -0.046 -0.048 -0.114*** -0.115*** 0.039 0.039 0.093*** 0.091*** 0.005 -0.002 
 (0.050) (0.050) (0.034) (0.034) (0.028) (0.028) (0.034) (0.034) (0.039) (0.038) 
SYSTEMIC_SHOCK 0.625*** 0.620*** -1.176*** -1.178*** -0.727*** -0.729*** 0.107 0.117 -0.049 -0.051 
 (0.209) (0.208) (0.138) (0.138) (0.118) (0.118) (0.125) (0.124) (0.138) (0.138) 
Constant -15.249*** -15.277*** -5.036*** -5.054*** -2.245** -2.250** 5.462*** 5.164*** 5.191*** 5.250*** 
 (3.386) (3.383) (1.862) (1.862) (1.037) (1.037) (1.226) (1.225) (1.519) (1.525) 
Pseudo R-squared 0.392 0.395 0.440 0.440 0.502 0.502 0.532 0.532 0.599 0.599 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 12,785 12,785 12,785 12,785 12,785 12,785 12,785 12,785 11,902 12,785 
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Table 8: Probability of Issuing Equity versus Decrease in Assets – Multinomial Logit Model 
This Table shows the regression results on the determinants of the likelihood to issue equity and to decrease assets under a Multinomial Logit setting. The models are 
estimated via a Random Multinomial Logit estimator with clustered standard errors that controls for unobserved bank heterogeneity. The dependent variable is a limited 
variable that takes the value of 1 if a bank has issued equity in a given year, the value of 2 if the bank’s total assets are reduced but no equity issues have taken place in the 
year and zero otherwise. The explanatory variables include bank and country characteristics. POORLY_CAPITALIZED is a dummy equal to one if a bank is in the first 
quartile of the equity/assets distribution, POORLY_CAPITALIZED_Y is a dummy equal to one if a bank is in the first quartile of the yearly equity/assets distribution, 
RISK is the volatility of the daily prices computed over the last quarter before the issue, RELPTB is Price to book ratio divided by the average Price to book ratio computed 
yearly at country level, ROA is the ratio between net income and total assets; YEARLISTED is the log of the number of years a bank has been listed in stock market, SIZE 
is the log of total assets measured in thousands of US dollars, DEPOSITS is computed as total customer deposits over total liabilities and MERGERS is a dummy equal to 1 
if a bank has been involved in a merger during the quarter, CPP is a dummy equal to one from the first quarter after a US bank has received capital support via the Capital 
Purchase Program, RESCUE is a dummy equal to one from the first quarter a non-US bank has received capital support . Country controls includes an index of regulatory 
independence (REG_INDEPENDENCE), an index measuring the regulatory strength (REG_STRENGHT), the ratio between public sector debt and country GDP 
(PUBLIC_DEBT) the total shares traded divided country GDP (SHARE TRADED) and the total accounting value of bank's net interest revenue as a share of its interest-
bearing (total earning) assets (MARKET POWER), a dummy equal to one for the first two quarters following a systemic shock (SYSTEMIC_SHOCK_2). Standard errors 
are reported in round brackets in parentheses *** (**,*) indicates significance at the 1(5,10) percent level. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 SEO Decrease in Assets SEO Decrease in Assets 
Panel A: Regression Analysis     
POORLY_CAPITALIZED 0.609*** 0.304***   
 (0.145) (0.091)   
POORLY_CAPITALIZED_Y   0.627*** 0.350*** 
   (0.146) (0.090) 
RISK 2.745*** 2.471*** 2.738*** 2.449*** 
 (0.743) (0.597) (0.742) (0.597) 
RELPTB 0.155*** -0.362*** 0.155*** -0.363*** 
 (0.044) (0.103) (0.044) (0.103) 
ROA -14.153*** -14.780*** -14.088*** -14.623*** 
 (4.403) (5.103) (4.380) (5.061) 
YEARLISTED -0.012* 0.008* -0.012* 0.009* 
 (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) 
SIZE 0.338*** -0.055** 0.338*** -0.057** 
 (0.033) (0.028) (0.033) (0.028) 
DEPOSITS 0.619* -1.681*** 0.637* -1.676*** 
 (0.371) (0.243) (0.370) (0.243) 
MERGERS 0.279 0.266 0.280 0.266 
 (0.356) (0.239) (0.356) (0.239) 
CPP 1.320*** 0.561*** 1.326*** 0.565*** 
 (0.170) (0.136) (0.170) (0.136) 
RESCUE 0.519 -0.653* 0.515 -0.659* 
 (0.317) (0.376) (0.317) (0.375) 
REG_INDEPENDENCE 2.262** 1.151*** 2.275** 1.148*** 
 (0.987) (0.314) (0.987) (0.314) 
REG_STRENGHT 0.043 -0.528*** 0.042 -0.528*** 
 (0.106) (0.088) (0.104) (0.088) 
PUBLIC_DEBT -0.013*** -0.025*** -0.014*** -0.025*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
SHARE_TRADED 0.003*** 0.001 0.003*** 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
MARKET POWER -0.038 0.006 -0.041 0.001 
 (0.052) (0.072) (0.052) (0.071) 
SYSTEMIC_SHOCK 0.498*** -0.075 0.494*** -0.077 
 (0.184) (0.133) (0.183) (0.132) 
Constant -13.043*** 2.853** -13.050*** 2.892** 
 (3.143) (1.287) (3.137) (1.288) 
Pseudo R-squared 0.136 0.136 0.136 0.136 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 12,785 12,785 12,785 12,785 
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Panel B: Test for difference between the coefficients of POORLY_CAPITALIZED (POORLY_CAPITALIZED_Y) in the SEO and Decrease in Assets regressions 
Column 1 (SEO)– Column 2 (Decrease in Assets) – p-value in bracket 0.305* 
(0.05) 
   
Column 3 (SEO)– Column 4 (Decrease in Assets) – p-value in bracket   0.277* 
(0.08) 
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Figure 1: Number of Countries Affected by a Severe Systemic Shock in a Given Quarter. 
This figure shows the number of countries that have been affected by a systemic shock, as defined by Von Hagen and Ho (2007), in a 
given quarter during the sample period ranging from the first quarter of 1993 to the second quarter of 2011. We report details on the 
methodology proposed by Von Hagen and Ho (2007) in the Appendix. 
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Appendix: The identification of periods of systemic distress 
The index proposed by von Hagen and Ho (2007) identifies systemic crises via the identification 
of distress conditions in the money market. More precisely, the distress is related to both the 
changes in the money market rate and the changes in bank reserves. More formally, the index is 
constructed as follows: 
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where tjr ,  is the real short-term money market rate in country j in the quarterly period t  and tj,  
is the ratio of total credit from the monetary authority (as a measure of central bank’s liquidity 
support) to total deposits in country j in the same quarter t.   is the difference operator, and 
j
   
and 
jr
  are the standard deviations of the two components. 
j
   and jr serve as scaling factors 
and are computed based on rolling windows of the 8 preceding quarters. 
von Hagen and Ho (2007) argue that the index can be used to detect banking crises since a 
banking crisis eventually results in a severe shortage of aggregate private liquidity either because of 
sudden withdrawal of retail and wholesale deposits or because of deteriorating asset quality. The 
shortage of aggregate private liquidity will generate an increase of the price of this liquidity as 
measured by the increase in the short-term money-market rate. In this case the index will detect a 
banking crisis by the sharp rise in its first component. The Central Bank can decide to counteract the 
shortage of private liquidity and flood the banking sector with additional public liquidity that comes 
in the form of credit to financial institutions. In this case the index will signal a banking crisis 
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because of the rise in central bank’s credit (the second component of the index) even in the case of 
no detectable rise in the price of private liquidity. Following this argument, extremely high values of 
the index of money market pressure can be used as a signal of periods of severe liquidity shortages 
and banking system distress.  
As in von Hagen and Ho (2007) we establish that a systemic shock leading to a banking crisis occurs 
when the value of the index is very high; namely, if it exceeds the 97.5th percentile of the sample 
distribution of the index for the respective country. In addition, the increase in the index value from 
the previous period has to be at least 5%. If these two conditions are simultaneously met the crisis 
variable takes the value of 1 in a given quarter, otherwise it takes the value of 0. As pointed out by 
von Hagen and Ho (2007), the index offers indications on the beginning date of a severe crisis while 
it does not permit a precise identification of its conclusion. Nevertheless, this is a general problem of 
any method adopted to identify banking crises. It is worth noting that the systemic distress indicator 
can be computed also at monthly intervals. Nevertheless the remaining variables that we present in 
the next section are available at best at quarterly frequency. Furthermore, the use of a monthly 
frequency as in Erel et al. (2012) would generate only a very small portion of non-zero observations 
of the binary dependent variable since the number of SEOs relative to the number of bank 
observations is relatively low. Hence, the monthly frequency would cause problems in the estimation 
of the model through maximum likelihood because the SEO decision would appear as an extremely 
‘rare event’ in the sample (see King and Zeng 2001 for a detailed discussion of this problem).  
 
